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From Jeopardy! to Jaundice: The Medical Liability 
Implications of Dr. Watson and Other Artificial 
Intelligence Systems 
In the not so distant future, medical mysteries will crumble in 
the face of a more efficient, less dysfunctional Dr. House.1 Imagine 
that a patient walks into an emergency room with a wide spectrum 
of symptoms. Rather than subject the patient to an infinite battery of 
tests, the patient is sent to Watson, a medical supercomputer with 
borderline artificial intelligence.2 Watson analyzes the patient’s 
genome, reads the patient’s lifetime medical record, and searches 
through the entire body of medical knowledge, including the most 
cutting-edge research, to determine the likeliest diagnoses and most 
promising courses of treatment.3 In a matter of seconds, Watson 
compresses a process that normally takes an ordinary physician 
weeks to accomplish.4 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2013, by JESSICA S. ALLAIN. 
 1. House is a popular TV drama featuring Hugh Laurie as Dr. Gregory 
House, a gifted but troubled physician who solves a different medical mystery in 
every episode. House M.D., THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www 
.imdb.com/title/tt0412142/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2011). 
 2. Watson is named after International Business Machines Corporation’s 
(IBM) founder, Thomas J. Watson. STEPHEN BAKER, FINAL JEOPARDY: MAN VS. 
MACHINE AND THE QUEST TO KNOW EVERYTHING 19 (2011). Although Watson 
currently lacks true artificial intelligence, his ability to learn by favoring more 
successful algorithms over less successful algorithms shows the rudimentary 
beginnings of artificial intelligence. Id. at 150. This Comment focuses on the issue 
of emerging artificial intelligence technologies in the healthcare industry. 
 3. Video, Experts and IBM Insiders Break Down Watson’s Jeopardy! Win, 
at 17:40–20:46, TED BLOG (Feb. 18, 2011), http://blog.ted.com/2011/02/18/experts 
-and-ibm-insiders-break-down-watsons-jeopardy-win/. Although researchers have 
not commented on the possibility of Watson using a patient’s personal genome to 
further enhance diagnosis and treatment, it is reasonable to suppose that this 
development may occur in the future. IBM has already developed Blue Gene, a 
supercomputer designed to analyze the human genome. Blue Gene Watson, IBM, 
https://researcher.ibm.com/researcher/view_project.php?id=1207 (last visited Mar. 
8, 2013). Further, personalized medicine is trending nationally, which includes 
eventually incorporating an individual’s personal genome into his electronic 
medical records. Scott Megill, Personalizing Medicine with Genetics, A SMARTER 
PLANET (July 15, 2011), http://asmarterplanet.com/blog/2011/07 /personalizing-
medicine-with-genetics.html. Many leading researchers are currently working on 
making individualized medicine based on each individual’s genetics a reality. 
Video, Richard Resnick: Welcome to the Genomic Revolution, at 6:30–:50, 
TED.COM (Sept. 2011), http://www.ted.com/talks/richard_resnick_welcome_to 
_the_genomic_revolution.html. 
 4. Video, A System Designed for Answers, at 0:15–:31, IBM, http://www-
03.ibm.com/systems/power/advantages/watson/index.html (last visited Apr. 8, 
2013), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cU-AhmQ363I. 
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Just down the hall in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), another 
Watson station alerts the medical team that micro-changes in a 
patient’s biochemistry indicate that a secondary infection will likely 
present itself within a few days. Because Watson can monitor 
millions of data points and vital signs related to the patient by 
interfacing directly with medical monitoring equipment, the 
patient’s outcome can significantly improve with faster detection 
and treatment.5 In the clinic next door, a third Watson unit is 
working with a soldier thousands of miles away in war-torn 
Afghanistan.6 Watson can help lead less qualified healthcare 
professionals through specialized treatment, expanding the ability of 
limited military resources.7 
Although International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) 
developed Watson to play Jeopardy!, a healthcare team from 
Columbia University is currently repurposing “him” to diagnose 
patients, suggest treatments, and answer medical questions.8 Watson 
                                                                                                             
 5. Researchers have discussed the possibility of integrating Watson into 
other equipment to further his ability to gather information. Experts and IBM 
Insiders Break Down Watson’s Jeopardy! Win, supra note 3, at 12:10–:51. 
Integrating Watson into electronic medical monitoring equipment is one 
possibility where this could be used.  
 6. Although researchers have not focused on Watson’s potential for 
telemedicine, this would be a natural development for IBM because it has a 
research department focused on expanding telemedicine services. Focus on . . . 
Telemedicine, IBM (last visited Mar. 8, 2013), http://domino.watson.ibm.com 
/odis/odis.nsf/pages/focus.08.html. Researchers are planning to integrate Watson 
into other technologies to expand his ability. Experts and IBM Insiders Break 
Down Watson’s Jeopardy! Win, supra note 3, at 12:10–:51, 15:53–16:55.  
 7. The ability to provide medical services from a distance will also be vital 
for recovery response to natural disasters or anywhere else with a shortage of 
healthcare providers. See Jonathan M. Teich, Michael M. Wagner, Colin F. 
Mackenzie & Klaus O. Schafer, The Informatics Response in Disaster, Terrorism, 
and War, 9 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASSOC. 97, 101–04 (2002) (discussing the 
importance of telemedicine in disaster response and war). 
 8. IBM has a history of developing new technology around games. In 1997, 
IBM’s Deep Blue computer was the first computer system to beat a grand master 
at chess in IBM’s first “Grand Challenge.” BAKER, supra note 2, at 20. IBM’s next 
grand challenge came when IBM developed Blue Gene, the world’s first 
supercomputer, designed to work on analyzing the human genome. Id. Watson 
represents the latest grand challenge. Id. Researchers chose to develop the system 
around Jeopardy! because of the advances that would be required in natural 
language processing and deep analytics. Id. When Watson competed on 
Jeopardy!, he defeated the two greatest Jeopardy! players of all time and won one 
million dollars. IBM’s Watson Supercomputer Crowned Jeopardy King, BBC 
NEWS (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/technology-12491688. Darren 
Murph, Columbia Doctors Turn to IBM’s Watson for Patient Diagnosis, 
Clairvoyance, ENGADGET.COM (Mar. 24, 2011, 1:01 PM), http://www.engadget 
.com/2011/03/24/columbia-doctors-turn-to-ibms-watson-for-patient-diagnosis-
cla/. For the sake of simplicity, Watson will be referred to as “he” throughout this 
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is the first system to truly understand questions posed in natural 
language and to tap into the entire body of medical knowledge and 
personal records of a patient to develop a diagnosis or treatment plan 
in less than three seconds.9 Initially, Watson will be able to answer 
physicians’ questions, to suggest diagnoses and treatments, and to 
give the physicians the probability of success and medical evidence 
supporting each option.10 Eventually, Watson may be able to 
interface directly with medical equipment and directly treat patients 
with much less physician interaction.11 Once Watson connects to the 
Internet, it is possible that he will be able to interface with a patient 
anywhere in the world, including underserved rural, prison, and 
refugee populations.12 Watson’s potential contributions to healthcare 
are astounding, but the potential complications that could arise when 
the law tries to respond to this new technology are equally 
staggering.  
The law should encourage this innovative technology’s growth. 
Artificial intelligence systems like Watson can fill gaps that 
healthcare shortages cause and enhance the quality of care that 
patients receive.13 Creating a streamlined approach for assessing 
liability against artificial intelligence systems will encourage their 
use by clarifying unknown potential liabilities. By combining 
elements from medical malpractice, vicarious liability, products 
liability, and enterprise liability, the law can create a uniform 
approach for artificial intelligence systems, thereby eliminating any 
inequities that may arise from courts applying different theories of 
liability.  
                                                                                                             
 
Comment. Moreover, Watson’s opponents consistently refer to the system as “he.” 
BAKER, supra note 2, at 131. 
 9. A System Designed for Answers, supra note 4, at 0:15–:31; Video, 
Perspectives on Watson: Healthcare, at 1:44–2:10, IBM, http://www-03.ibm.com 
/innovation/us/watson/watson_in_healthcare.shtml (last visited Mar. 8, 2013), 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vwDdyxj6S0U. 
 10. Experts and IBM Insiders Break Down Watson’s Jeopardy! Win, supra 
note 3, at 14:57–15:08, 17:40–19:15. 
 11. The Watson team regularly discusses how the system’s capabilities will 
grow as he integrates further into additional technology. Medical equipment is a 
natural extension. Id. at 12:10–:51, 15:53–16:55.  
 12. See supra notes 6–7. 
 13. Experts anticipate that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001–18121), 
which will go into effect in 2014, will cause a shortage of at least 150,000 doctors, 
especially in primary care fields. Suzanne Sataline & Shirley S. Wang, Medical 
Schools Can’t Keep Up, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 12, 2011), http://online.wsj.com 
/article/SB10001424052702304506904575180331528424238.html. 
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This Comment explores how the law should assess liability 
against artificial intelligence systems.14 Part I of this Comment 
discusses Watson, other areas of cutting-edge medical technology, 
and the law’s response to them. Part II analyzes current liability 
regimes—including medical malpractice, products liability, and 
vicarious liability—to determine how effectively these legal 
mechanisms can apply to artificial intelligence systems. Part II also 
explains why current liability regimes are inadequate. Finally, Part 
III proposes an integrated system for assessing liability against 
artificial intelligence systems based on enterprise liability. 
I. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY IN ROBOTICS AND ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 
Watson is one of many emerging medical technologies with the 
potential to change medical practice in the United States. The legal 
response to some of these technologies—particularly robotic surgery 
systems, cybermedicine, and telemedicine—is slowly developing.15 
Because Watson shares many characteristics with these other forms 
of technology, courts will likely use jurisprudence based on these 
systems to analyze lawsuits involving Watson.16 
A. Watson and the Next Frontier of Artificial Intelligence in 
Medicine 
Over the last five years, approximately 25 researchers at IBM 
have been developing Watson—a super-computer capable of 
answering questions posed in natural language.17 Historically, 
natural language has been a computational limitation because of the 
naturally occurring ambiguities and complexities in human speech.18 
                                                                                                             
 14. Technically, Watson does not have true artificial intelligence. BAKER, 
supra note 2, at 150. However, he represents advancement in the field, particularly 
in computers capable of learning. Id. Further, he is a great model for starting the 
discussion about artificial intelligence and the law.  
 15. See infra Part I.B–C. 
 16. With no direct precedent on point, courts often analogize to current law in 
other areas for guidance on deciding new issues. See Hufft v. Horowitz, 5 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (finding implanted medical devices analogous 
to prescription drugs for purposes of applying liability). 
 17. Clive Thompson, What Is IBM’s Watson?, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2010),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/magazine/20Computer-t.html?pagewanted 
=all; Experts and IBM Insiders Break Down Watson’s Jeopardy! Win, supra note 3, 
at 11:40–:46. 
 18. Video, The Science Behind an Answer, at 1:07–:12, IBM, http://www-
03.ibm.com/innovation/us/watson/science-behind_watson.shtml (last visited Apr. 
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The IBM team developed Watson’s skills for Jeopardy! because the 
show’s questions require a full understanding of natural human 
speech—including nuances, regionalisms, and wordplay.19 Aside 
from his ability to understand questions, Watson can also answer 
them.20 As opposed to a search engine like Google, which looks for 
keywords to direct the user to websites and documents where the 
answer might be found, Watson is capable of actually understanding 
questions posed and giving the user the correct answer.21 This 
represents an extraordinary leap in artificial intelligence, deep 
analytics, and language processing.22  
Watson uses a four-step process to interpret and answer 
questions.23 First, Watson breaks down the question into its parts of 
speech to identify what kind of question is being asked and what the 
question is asking for.24 After determining the question type, 
Watson searches his database to come up with thousands of possible 
answers to all possible questions generated in the first step.25 Third, 
Watson goes through a process of hypothesis and evidence testing 
where he looks for negative and positive evidence for all potential 
answers generated in the previous step.26 Finally, Watson merges 
and ranks all potential answers by using his past experience at 
answering similar types of questions to create rankings and calculate 
the likelihood that the answers are correct.27 Watson does all of this 
in less than three seconds.28  
Watson is ideal for the healthcare industry for several reasons. 
First, there is simply too much information for a single doctor to 
constantly have at his fingertips, and the body of medical literature 
currently doubles every seven years.29 It is very difficult for 
                                                                                                             
 
8, 2013), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DywO4zksfXw, at 1:07–
1:12. 
 19. Video, Why Jeopardy!?, at 0:24–:38, IBM, http://www-03.ibm.com 
/innovation/us/watson/the_jeopardy_challenge.shtml, (last visited Apr. 8, 2013), 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_1c7s7-3fXI. 
 20. The Science Behind an Answer, supra note 18, at 2:18–:48. 
 21. Id. at 1:13–:23; Thompson, supra note 17. 
 22. A System Designed for Answers, supra note 4, at 0:15–:31, 1:45–:54. 
 23. The Science Behind an Answer, supra note 18, at 2:04–:18. 
 24. Id. at 2:18–:48. 
 25. Id. at 2:48–3:19. 
 26. Id. at 3:19–4:19. Watson can do this because of the power7 system, a 
super computer with vast processing power that IBM designed for this project. 
This system has wide application in deep analytics and parallel problem solving. A 
System Designed for Answers, supra note 4, at 1:17–:30, 1:45–:54. 
 27. The Science Behind an Answer, supra note 18, at 4:19–6:03. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Perspectives on Watson: Healthcare, supra note 9, at 1:44–:48.  
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physicians to be aware of, let alone address, their own information 
gaps.30 Furthermore, many doctors have a multitude of questions 
that cannot be answered easily and quickly after a full day of 
treating patients.31 Watson is capable of providing a simple and 
direct answer to a doctor’s complex medical question in seconds.32 
Second, the human body contains too many variables for humans to 
concurrently monitor.33 Watson not only has the ability to monitor 
an individual’s health, but he can also individualize treatment based 
on the patient’s medical records.34 Third, Watson can act as a 
decision support assistant and develop a better differential 
diagnosis.35 By calculating all the possible diagnoses and courses of 
treatment while also providing the evidence to the acting physician, 
Watson better enables the physician and patient to make informed 
decisions about medical care.36 Watson can alleviate many sources 
of medical error by filling in informational gaps throughout 
treatment.37  
Watson does have limitations, however. He does not always 
realize when an answer is absurd or out of context.38 For instance, 
he incorrectly answered, “What is Toronto?” to a question in the 
U.S. Cities category.39 Further, Watson does not currently have the 
capacity to hear or see, although researchers will work on adding 
these features in the future.40 When originally designed for 
                                                                                                             
 30. Experts and IBM Insiders Break Down Watson’s Jeopardy! Win, supra 
note 3, at 28:49–29:20. 
 31. Id. at 17:00–:40. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Research suggests that human processing capacity may be limited to as 
little as four variables at any given time. Graeme S. Halford, Rosemary Baker, 
Julie E. McCredden & John D. Bain, How Many Variables Can Humans 
Process?, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 70, 75 (2005), available at http://www.psychological 
science.org/pdf/ps/mind_variables.pdf. 
 34. Experts and IBM Insiders Break Down Watson’s Jeopardy! Win, supra 
note 3, at 17:40–19:15. 
 35. Id. at 20:18–:46. Differential diagnosis is “the distinguishing of a disease 
or condition from others presenting with similar signs and symptoms.” Differential 
Diagnosis Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com 
/dictionary/differential%20diagnosis (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). 
 36. Experts and IBM Insiders Break Down Watson’s Jeopardy! Win, supra 
note 3, at 17:40–19:15. 
 37. Id. at 28:49–29:20. Perspectives on Watson: Healthcare, supra note 9, at 
0:46–:58, 1:44–2:10. 
 38. Video, Final Jeopardy! and the Future of Watson, at 3:13–4:35, IBM, 
http://www-07.ibm.com/innovation/in/watson/what-is-watson/the-future-of-
watson.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2013), available at http://www.youtube.com 
/watch?v=lI-M7O_bRNg. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Experts and IBM Insiders Break Down Watson’s Jeopardy! Win, supra 
note 3, at 15:53–16:55. 
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Jeopardy!, Watson used a database built by IBM rather than 
connecting to the Internet.41 Being linked into evidence-based 
treatment guidelines42 or Internet databases, such as Wolfram Alpha43 
and PubMed,44 will expand Watson’s library of information. 
Researchers will continue working on Watson to increase his 
functionality in healthcare.45  
B. Robotic Surgical Systems 
Watson is not the only emerging medical technology that could 
raise serious legal concerns. In recent years, various robotic surgery 
systems have gained popularity in the United States.46 The da Vinci 
and Zeus systems are composed of two robotic arms linked to a 
control panel by fiberoptic cable.47 The robotic arms are capable of 
extremely fine motor skills, and they allow more precision than 
traditional open surgery.48  
                                                                                                             
 41. Watson’s developers did not think Jeopardy! would want Watson to have 
access to the Internet because other contestants on the show would not have such 
access. BAKER, supra note 2, at 30.  
 42. “[E]vidence-based medicine is the ‘conscientious, explicit, and judicious 
use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual 
patients. The practice of evidence-based medicine means integrating individual 
clinical expertise with the best available external clinical evidence from systematic 
research.’” Nicolas P. Terry, An eHealth Diptych: The Impact of Privacy 
Regulation on Medical Error and Malpractice Litigation, 27 AM. J. L. & MED. 
361, 385 (2001) (citation omitted). National standards for evidence-based 
guidelines can be found online through the National Guideline Clearing House, 
MedScape, AHRQ, organizations for medical specialties, and the U.S. National 
Library of Medicine Medline source. Id. at 386. 
 43. WolframAlpha is an Internet search engine that answers fact-based 
questions by computing the answer from structured data. Ian Paul, WolframAlpha 
Will Take Your Questions -- Any Questions, PCWORLD (Mar. 9, 2009, 7:36 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/160904/wolfram.html. 
 44. PubMed is a free database maintained by the U.S. National Library of 
Medicine and the National Institute of Health, providing abstracts to over 21 
million citations to biomedical literature. PUBMED, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov 
/pubmed/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). 
 45. Experts and IBM Insiders Break Down Watson’s Jeopardy! Win, supra 
note 3, at 12:10–:51, 15:53–16:55.  
 46. Thomas R. McLean, Cybersurgery: Innovation or a Means to Close 
Community Hospitals and Displace Physicians?, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & 
INFO. L. 495, 498 (2002).  
 47. Id. While there are many similarities between the systems, there are a few 
differences. Id. The da Vinci system provides the surgeon with full stereoscopic 
vision, while the Zeus system is limited to a two-dimensional view. Id. 
Alternately, Zeus can respond to both voice commands and manual commands, 
while da Vinci is limited to manual commands alone. Id. at 498–99.  
 48. Id. at 498.  
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Rather than operate from the patient’s bedside, the surgeon 
manipulates the robot from a control panel as if playing a 
videogame.49 Commonly, the control panel and robot are in the 
same surgical suite, but they can also be thousands of miles apart.50 
In fact, the first cybersurgery featured a physician in New York 
operating on a patient located in France.51  
Although there is little jurisprudence surrounding the Zeus and 
da Vinci systems, there has been at least one documented death 
resulting from the use of the da Vinci system.52 In 2002, a Florida 
man died after a botched kidney operation in which the surgeon 
used the da Vinci system.53 His family filed suit in state court, 
charging the hospital with negligence based on the surgeon’s lack of 
training and experience in operating the system.54 The case 
ultimately settled out of court,55 and courts have not yet addressed 
liability issues related to adequate training, mechanical 
malfunctions, and interruptions in communication between the 
consoles. 
The legal issues that will persist with robotic surgical systems 
will likely bleed into the legal analysis of artificial intelligence 
systems in medicine. Although Watson currently lacks robotic 
components, any jurisprudence related to robotic surgical systems 
will likely serve as precedent for dealing with liability related to 
Watson. Watson is similar to the Zeus and da Vinci systems because 
he is highly advanced medical technology used by physicians to 
treat patients. Although both Watson and the robotic surgical 
systems depend on human interaction to treat patients, the 
interacting physician has no control over many aspects of these 
systems. Physicians have even less control over Watson, who works 
on his own and reports back to the physician, as opposed to the 
robotic systems, which depend completely on the physician to 
function. Because who should be held liable when injuries arise out 
                                                                                                             
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 498–99. 
 51. Id. at 499. Cybersurgery is a surgical technique that allows a surgeon, 
using a telecommunication conduit connected to a robotic instrument, to operate 
on a remote patient. Id. 
 52. Graham Brink, Patient Dies in Robot-Aided Surgery, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, October 30, 2002, http://www.sptimes.com/2002/10/30/TampaBay/Patient 
_dies_in_robot.shtml; Joshua B. Good, Lawsuit Targets Doctor’s Training, 
TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 17, 2003, at Metro 1, available at http://yerrid.com/verdict61 
.cfm. 
 53. Brink, supra note 52; Good, supra note 52. 
 54. Brink, supra note 52; Good, supra note 52. 
 55. See Case Summary, Greenway v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., No. 03-CA-011667 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 2003), http://pubrec10.hillsclerk.com/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID 
=2061783 (showing the case’s voluntary dismissal on October 7, 2005). 
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of the use of robotic surgical systems is unclear, any decisions 
allocating responsibility and liability could be used to analyze cases 
arising out of Watson’s use. 
C. Cybermedicine and Telemedicine 
Watson’s use implicates legal issues surrounding telemedicine 
and cybermedicine. Being connected to the Internet could allow 
Watson to interact with physicians and patients anywhere in the 
world. Cybermedicine is generally defined as “the discipline of 
applying the Internet to medicine.”56 However, the term can 
encompass everything from pharmaceutical sales and email 
communications between doctors and patients to diagnosis and 
treatment via video chat.57 As more people rely on the Internet to 
interact with health care professionals, the legal regime for dealing 
with practicing medicine via cybermedicine becomes crucial.58 
Telemedicine is defined as the long-distance practice of 
medicine via telecommunications.59 Cybermedicine is merely an 
extension of telemedicine using the Internet.60 Telemedicine is 
becoming more prevalent in rural and prison populations.61 Many 
hospitals also use telemedicine to cover specialty areas, such as 
                                                                                                             
 56. Kim Solez & Sheila Moriber Katz, Cybermedicine: Mainstream Medicine 
by 2020/Crossing Boundaries, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 557, 557 
(2001). 
 57. Katherine J. Herrmann, Cybersurgery: The Cutting Edge, 32 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 297, 307 (2006). 
 58. A 2000 survey by the Pew Research Center’s Internet and American Life 
Project shows that a majority of Internet users have used the Internet to obtain 
health information, and the number of people using the Internet for health 
purposes has continuously increased. Solez & Katz, supra note 56, at 559. 
 59. Various definitions for telemedicine have been proposed. The World 
Health Organization defines telemedicine as  
[t]he delivery of healthcare services, where distance is a critical factor, by 
all healthcare professionals using information and communications 
technologies for the exchange of valid information for diagnosis, treatment 
and prevention of disease and injuries, research and evaluation, and for the 
continuing education of health care providers, all in the interests of 
advancing the health of individuals and their communities.  
Herrmann, supra note 57, at 307 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The 
American Medical Association defines telemedicine as “[m]edical practice across 
distance via telecommunications and interactive video technology.” Id. (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, the American Telemedicine 
Association defines telemedicine as “the use of medical information exchanged 
from one site to another via electronic communications to improve patients’ health 
status.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60. Solez & Katz, supra note 56, at 557. 
 61. Nicolas P. Terry, A Medical Ghost in the E-Health Machine, 14 HEALTH 
MATRIX 225, 226 (2004). 
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radiology, during evenings and weekends when those specialty 
services may be unavailable because fewer specialists are working.62 
Thus, hospitals are already using telemedicine and cybermedicine to 
fill in the gaps in physician staffing. With worsening healthcare 
provider shortages expected after the enactment of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) in 2014, telemedicine 
and cybermedicine can be used to extend healthcare resources.63 
Although cybermedicine and telemedicine are becoming 
increasingly more common, serious legal issues remain unresolved 
with their use. Because telemedicine and cybermedicine create 
situations where doctors and patients are often in different states, if 
not different countries, questions arise regarding jurisdiction and 
licensing.64 Many states require physicians to be licensed in that 
state in order to practice medicine.65 A question arises as to where 
the medical practice actually occurs when the patient is in one state 
and the physician is in another.66 Many states have enacted statutes 
defining medical practice as occurring where the patient receives 
treatment, thus requiring the physician to be licensed in the patient’s 
state.67 These types of legal structures inhibit telemedicine by 
                                                                                                             
 62. Solez & Katz, supra note 56, at 562. Because of a national shortage in 
radiology, many hospitals outsource radiology services to India. Associated Press, 
Some U.S. Hospitals Outsourcing Work: Shortage of Radiologists Spurs 
Telemedicine Trend, NBCNEWS.COM (Dec. 16, 2004, 12:28 PM), http://www 
.nbcnews.com/id/6621014/ns/health-health_care/t/some-us-hospitals-outsourcing-
work/. The scan of a patient is taken at his local hospital and then sent to a 
radiologist in India via the Internet. Id. The radiologist in India then sends his 
report back to the local hospital. Id. 
 63. See supra note 13 (on anticipated healthcare shortages); Nina Russell, 
Using Telemedicine to Address Doctor Shortages, 9 YALE J. MED. & L., no. 1, 
2013, available at http://www.yalemedlaw.com/2013/02/using-telemedicine-to-
address-doctor-shortages; Heather Punke, 3 Ways Telemedicine Can Help 
Alleviate the Physician Shortage, BECKER’S HOSP. REVIEW (Jan. 8, 2013), 
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-physician-relationships/3-ways-
telemedicine-can-help-alleviate-the-physician-shortage.html. 
 64. Meghan Hamilton-Piercy, Cybersurgery: Why the United States Should 
Embrace This Emerging Technology, 7 J. HIGH TECH. L. 203, 214–18 (2007). The 
University of North Carolina (UNC) has entered into a contract with the 
University of Chile in which UNC will provide neonatal cardiac evaluations to 
Chilean newborns via telemedicine. This program expanded out of UNC’s 
initiative to provide cardiac evaluations to rural hospitals in North Carolina via 
telemedicine. Patricia C. Kuszler, Telemedicine and Integrated Health Care 
Delivery: Compounding Malpractice Liability, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 297, 303 
(1999). 
 65. Hamilton-Piercy, supra note 64, at 214–15 & n.57. 
 66. Gilbert Eric DeLeon, Telemedicine in Texas: Solving the Problems of 
Licensure, Privacy, and Reimbursement, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 651, 671 (2003). 
 67. Hamilton-Piercy, supra note 64, at 214–15 & n.57. For instance, Arkansas 
and Georgia both have statutes explaining that even in telemedicine situations, the 
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making interstate practice more difficult for physicians.68 Yet, 
several states have recognized the value of telemedicine and 
restructured their laws to encourage its use.69 Texas and several 
other states currently provide special-purpose licenses for out-of-
state physicians practicing telemedicine.70 The special-purpose 
licensing process is quicker and less expensive while still ensuring 
that the treating physician is competent and qualified.71 
The legal response to telemedicine and cybermedicine is very 
important to artificial intelligence systems like Watson, who can 
make a global impact through telemedicine and cybermedicine. The 
Internet could give Watson the capacity to treat patients anywhere in 
the world, including patients in rural areas, war-torn areas, and areas 
                                                                                                             
 
practice of medicine is considered to be within the state and the physician must be 
licensed in the state where the patient is treated. Id. ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-206 
(Westlaw 2013) (“A physician who is physically located outside this state but who 
through the use of any medium, including an electronic medium, performs an act 
that is part of a patient care service initiated in this state, including the 
performance or interpretation of an X-ray examination or the preparation or 
interpretation of pathological material that would affect the diagnosis or treatment 
of the patient, is engaged in the practice of medicine in this state for the purposes 
of this chapter and is subject to this chapter and to appropriate regulation by the 
Arkansas State Medical Board. This section does not apply to: (1) The acts of a 
medical specialist located in another jurisdiction who provides only episodic 
consultation services; (2) The acts of a physician located in another jurisdiction 
who is providing consultation services to a medical school; (3) Decisions 
regarding the denial or approval of coverage under any insurance or health 
maintenance organization plan; (4) A service to be performed which is not 
available in the state; (5) A physician physically seeing a patient in person in 
another jurisdiction; or (6) Other acts exempted by the board by regulation.”); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 43-34-31(a) (Westlaw 2013) (“A person who is physically located in 
another state or foreign country and who, through the use of any means, including 
electronic, radiographic, or other means of telecommunication, through which 
medical information or data are transmitted, performs an act that is part of a 
patient care service located in this state, including but not limited to the initiation 
of imaging procedures or the preparation of pathological material for examination, 
and that would affect the diagnosis or treatment of the patient is engaged in the 
practice of medicine in this state. Any person who performs such acts through 
such means shall be required to have a license to practice medicine in this state 
and shall be subject to regulation by the board. Any such out-of-state or foreign 
practitioner shall not have ultimate authority over the care or primary diagnosis of 
a patient who is located in this state.”).  
 68. Hamilton-Piercy, supra note 64, at 214–15. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 671 & n.105. Other states with similar special licensing procedures 
for telemedicine practitioners include Alabama, ALA. CODE § 34-24-500 (Westlaw 
2013), and South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-4-41 (Westlaw 2013). Id.  
 71. Id. See also 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 174.3 (2013).  
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recovering from natural disasters.72 With healthcare shortages 
anticipated in the United States by 2014, Watson could become a 
vital tool in helping primary care providers expand their ability to 
provide services.73 States should continue to revise and lessen 
restrictions on telemedicine so that this technology can grow and fill 
many healthcare gaps, both in the United States and abroad. Aside 
from standard issues about licensing, it is unclear whether there will 
be some kind of medical licensing requirements for artificial 
intelligence systems, let alone for artificial intelligence systems 
practicing interstate medicine. If artificial intelligence specifications 
are held to a legal standard before being used in medical practice, it 
is left to be seen how these systems might be certified or to what 
standards they will be held. 
Many questions remain regarding how courts will handle issues 
arising from emerging medical technology. Cases on robotic 
surgical systems, cybermedicine, and telemedicine can serve as 
precedent in dissecting questions that may arise from using Watson, 
but there are key differences between the technologies. Once courts 
begin to clarify the legal standards that will govern long-distance 
medicine and robotics, new issues will surface dealing with 
Watson’s rudimentary artificial intelligence.  
II. THE CURRENT NATIONAL LEGAL LANDSCAPE AND POTENTIAL 
LIABILITY REGIMES APPLICABLE TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
TECHNOLOGY 
Courts and legislatures have developed many theories of 
recovery for injuries arising out of medical treatment. Medical 
malpractice generally applies to healthcare providers.74 Vicarious 
liability focuses on institutions that employ healthcare providers.75 
Products liability attaches to defective equipment and medical 
devices that healthcare providers may use.76 Watson partially fits 
into all of these categories, but no single theory of recovery 
                                                                                                             
 72. See supra notes 6–7. 
 73. See supra note 13 (on anticipated healthcare shortages); supra note 63 (on 
how telemedicine can help healthcare shortage). 
 74. 1 THOMAS A. MOORE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL § 
1:1 (2004); 1 STEVEN E. PEGALIS, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 
1:1 (2005), available at Westlaw. 
 75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 13 
(2000); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 150 (2011). 
 76. AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1:1 (Westlaw 2013); 1 DAVID 
G. OWEN, M. STUART MADDEN & MARY J. DAVIS, MADDEN & OWEN ON 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1:5 (3d ed. 2000). 
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sufficiently covers the liability questions that may arise from a 
computer system capable of practicing medicine. 
A. Medical Malpractice 
Medical malpractice is a subset of general negligence law, 
whereby the physician has a duty to the patient and breaches this duty 
by failing to act as a reasonably prudent physician.77 A provider–
patient relationship is a prerequisite to a medical malpractice action.78 
If that relationship exists, the next inquiry is whether the patient has 
consented to the particular treatment.79 If so, liability depends on 
whether the medical care is properly performed.80 
The standard medical malpractice action becomes far more 
complicated when an artificial intelligence system is injected into 
the physician–patient relationship.81 In a medical malpractice claim 
involving a treating physician’s consultation with another physician, 
the plaintiff can only establish liability against the other physician if 
                                                                                                             
 77. MOORE, supra note 74; PEGALIS supra note 74, § 1:1, 1:3. 
 78. MOORE, supra note 74, § 2:1.1; Kuznar v. Raksha Corp., 750 N.W.2d 
121, 128 (Mich. 2008) (holding that a pharmacist could not be held liable under 
medical malpractice because there was no physician–patient relationship); 
Oblachinski v. Reynolds, 706 S.E.2d 844, 846 (S.C. 2011) (holding that only a 
patient can bring a medical malpractice claim against a physician, as opposed to 
third parties affected indirectly); Estate of French v. Stratford House, 333 S.W.3d 
546, 555 (Tenn. 2011) (holding that a physician–patient relationship is a 
prerequisite to a claim under the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act). 
 79. Many medical malpractice actions arise from a lack of informed consent. 
MOORE, supra note 74, § 2:2.2. Originally, many medical malpractice claims were 
treated as battery claims, the medical treatment itself being an unwanted and 
offensive contact. Matthies v. Mastromonaco, D.O., 733 A.2d 456, 460 (N.J. 
1999). These types of claims are now typically adjudicated on the basis of 
informed consent, i.e., whether the physician fully informed the patient of all 
aspects of the treatment prior to the patient consenting. Id. at 460–61. 
 80. MOORE, supra note 74, § 2:1.2; PEGALIS, supra note 74, § 1:1. 
 81. Some courts have held physicians liable under medical malpractice for 
using defective or malfunctioning equipment, but the defect or misuse generally 
must be blatant. S. Highlands Infirmary v. Camp, 180 So. 2d 904, 908 (Ala. 1965). 
In South Highlands Infirmary v. Camp, the court held that the defendant physician 
was not liable for using defective equipment because the defect was latent. Id. In 
dicta, the court suggested it would have found differently had the defect been 
patent. Id. In Mafhouz v. Xanar, a Louisiana appellate court held a physician liable 
for a defective laser that burned a patient because the doctor breached his duty to 
stop using the equipment when he started experiencing technical difficulties with 
the laser. Mahfouz v. Xanar, Inc., 646 So. 2d 1152, 1161 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
Similarly, in Washington v. Washington Hospital Center, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held a physician liable for 
misusing anesthesia equipment during surgery. Washington v. Washington Hosp. 
Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 180 (D.C. 1990).  
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a physician–patient relationship existed between them.82 Without the 
physician–patient relationship, the consulting provider has no legal 
duty to the plaintiff.83  
Because Watson is programmed to assume the role of a 
consulting physician, the question of his duty to patients is especially 
relevant to liability. Watson is vital to providing information to the 
treating physician but cannot yet take independent action in actually 
providing treatment.84 Current jurisprudence suggests that a 
consulting physician who does not interact with the patient has no 
duty to the patient.85 Because Watson will not interact with patients 
directly at first, there may be no duty to be breached as required for 
medical malpractice. 
Watson could be considered analogous to a consulting 
physician. In Hill v. Kokosky, the treating physician contacted two 
other physicians by telephone for a consultation.86 The consulting 
physicians never interacted with the patient or saw her medical chart 
but merely gave informal medical advice to the treating physician.87 
The court held that the consulting physicians did not establish a 
physician–patient relationship with the plaintiff and, therefore, owed 
no duty to her.88 Other courts have similarly held that consulting 
physicians who merely give advice, as opposed to orders or 
directions, without ever examining or talking to the patient, do not 
establish a physician–patient relationship giving rise to a cognizable 
medical malpractice claim.89  
                                                                                                             
 82. MOORE, supra note 74, § 2:1.1. 
 83. Id. 
 84. This situation will likely grow even more complicated if and when it 
becomes possible for Watson to interface directly with medical treatment and 
control life support equipment and the administration of medicine. See supra note 
5. 
 85. See Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 941 (Kan. 2001) (determining that a 
consulting physician who only gives an informal opinion to a treating physician 
owes no duty to the patient); St. John v. Pope, 901 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Tex. 1995) 
(holding that a consulting physician who had recommended that the patient be 
transferred to a different facility for treatment and had not agreed to treat the 
patient did not owe the patient a duty). 
 86. Hill v. Kokosky, 463 N.W.2d 265, 266 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 267.  
 89. See Jennings v. Badgett, 230 P.3d 861, 868 (Okla. 2010) (holding that 
“[a] telephone conversation between a non-treating physician and the treating 
physician concerning the patient, even when the treating physician relies on the 
non-treating physician’s opinion, without more, is insufficient to establish a 
physician-patient relationship”); Lopez v. Aziz, 852 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tex. App. 
1993) (holding that a single telephone conversation in which a treating physician 
sought advice from a colleague was insufficient to create a physician–patient 
relationship between the consulting physician and the patient); Schrader v. 
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If courts analogize Watson to a consulting physician, then he 
will owe no legal duty to a patient giving rise to a medical 
malpractice claim. This is likely because Watson can only 
recommend treatment to a physician after reading and analyzing 
patient records.90 If Watson evolves and obtains the ability to treat 
patients directly by interfacing with medical equipment, he will be 
much more intimately involved with the patient’s diagnosis and 
treatment than the consulting physician in Hill, who never interacted 
directly with the patient.91 Until that point, courts will likely have 
trouble finding that Watson has a duty to patients. 
Many medical malpractice claims are based on a lack of 
informed consent.92 Watson as a consulting physician raises issues 
regarding informed consent because patients will have to be fully 
informed that the physician is using Watson as a diagnostic tool and 
that he is contributing to the medical diagnosis and treatment.93 
Although the doctor is ultimately in charge of administering medical 
treatment, informed consent may require that a patient be fully 
informed of Watson’s results, including the options the physician 
                                                                                                             
 
Kohout, 522 S.E.2d 19, 21 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that numerous 
consultations between the patient’s psychologist and a colleague over a four-year 
period did not give rise to a physician–patient relationship between the consulting 
psychiatrist and the patient because the consultant never saw or examined the 
patient or her medical records and never had control over her medical treatment); 
Corbet v. McKinney, 980 S.W.2d 166, 170–71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that 
no physician–patient relationship exists “where the consult[ing] physician merely 
undertakes to advise the patient’s treating physician, has no explicit contractual 
obligation to the patient, treating physician, or treating hospital to provide care, 
and does not take actions which indicate knowing consent to treat a patient who 
has sought that treatment, such as by examining, diagnosing, treating, prescribing 
treatment for, or charging the patient”). 
 90. Experts and IBM Insiders Break Down Watson’s Jeopardy! Win, supra 
note 3, at 17:40–19:15. 
 91. Hill, 463 N.W.2d at 266. 
 92. A medical malpractice action based on a lack of informed consent arises 
when a physician fails to inform the patient of all relevant information about a 
course of treatment, particularly the risks. MOORE, supra note 74, § 2:2.2. The 
modern medical malpractice action evolved from the historical notion that a 
physician committed a battery by touching a patient without consent. See supra 
note 79. 
 93. A physician is required to inform the patient of “alternatives to the 
proposed treatment or diagnosis and the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits 
involved as would permit the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation.” 
MOORE, supra note 74, § 2:2.2[A]. To meet this standard, physicians may be 
required to disclose that they are using Watson and to obtain the patient’s 
permission to use him. 
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chose not to pursue.94 This could lead to increased disagreement 
between physicians and patients about the best course of treatment. 
Additionally, Watson’s involvement in a medical malpractice 
action could change the applicable standard of care to which 
physicians are held. Because Watson will be able to access an 
extraordinary amount of medical knowledge and evidence-based 
practice guidelines, situations in which the physician disagrees with 
Watson about the most appropriate course of treatment could arise.95 
Watson will be able to use much more information than human 
physicians ever could. Physicians who use Watson may be held to a 
higher standard than physicians who do not because of their access 
to additional information. The rise of artificial intelligence could 
cause courts to lean more heavily on national standards, evidence-
based treatment guidelines, and cutting-edge medicine to 
accommodate an enhanced standard of care. 
Even if courts were to hold that medical malpractice was 
appropriate for suits dealing with Watson, whether artificial 
intelligence systems are even capable of committing negligent acts 
is unclear. By definition, breaching the physician–patient duty 
requires a physician to fail to act as a reasonably proficient 
physician.96 Because Watson runs on a carefully calculated system 
of algorithms, always calculating the risks and probabilities of 
various outcomes, Watson may not be programmed to breach any 
duty; his actions and decisions are inherently reasonable by 
necessity.97 As machines begin practicing medicine, the traditional 
medical malpractice action must evolve to accommodate the newest 
batch of stainless steel M.D.’s, as the traditional action built for 
human physicians seems to have inadequacies when applied to 
artificial intelligence systems. 
B. Vicarious Liability 
Vicarious liability is a liability regime whereby one individual 
can be held legally responsible for the acts of another.98 This 
arrangement is most commonly found in the employer–employee 
relationship in which an employer can be held liable for the 
                                                                                                             
 94. Id. 
 95. BAKER, supra note 2, at 198. 
 96. MOORE, supra note 74, § 2:1.2. 
 97. The Science Behind an Answer, supra note 18, at 3:19–4:19; Experts and 
IBM Insiders Break Down Watson’s Jeopardy! Win, supra note 3, at 6:55–7:05. 
 98. JOHN M. CHURCH, WILLIAM R. CORBETT, THOMAS E. RICHARD & JOHN 
V. WHITE, TORT LAW: THE AMERICAN AND LOUISIANA PERSPECTIVES 515 (2008); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 13 (2000); 65 
C.J.S. Negligence § 150 (2011). 
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employee’s tortious conduct.99 Hospitals can be held vicariously 
liable for the acts of their employees, including physicians, who 
commit malpractice.100 Potentially, hospitals might also be 
vicariously liable for the actions of their artificial intelligence 
systems, like Watson. 
Unlike what is normally the case, a hospital can be held 
vicariously liable for independent contractor physicians’ acts 
through apparent agency.101 Generally, employers are not liable for 
the actions of independent contractors because no employer–
employee relationship exists.102 If it appears to a reasonable third 
party that the physician was providing services on behalf of the 
hospital or if the patient sought services from the hospital rather than 
the individual physician, then the hospital can be held vicariously 
liable under agency.103 In Clark v. Southview Hospital & Family 
Health Center, a young woman died due to negligent emergency 
medical care for an asthma attack.104 The Ohio Supreme Court held 
that the hospital was liable for an emergency room physician’s 
negligence, even though the doctor was technically an independent 
                                                                                                             
 99. CHURCH, CORBETT, RICHARD & WHITE, supra note 98; Leon E. Wein, 
The Responsibility of Intelligent Artifacts: Toward an Automation, 6 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 103, 110–11 (1992); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT 
OF LIABILITY § 13 cmt. a (2000). 
 100. PEGALIS, supra note 74, § 6:20. 
 101. Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Liability of Hospital or Sanitarium for 
Negligence of Independent Physician or Surgeon—Exception Where Physician 
Has Ostensible Agency or “Agency by Estoppel”, 64 A.L.R.6th 249, 249 (2011). 
Unless the hospital explicitly informs patients that the physicians are not hospital 
employees, patients may assume that they are. PEGALIS, supra note 74, § 6:21 
(citing Mehlman v. Powell, 378 A.2d 1121 (Md. 1977)). See also Gilbert v. 
Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 622 N.E.2d 788, 793–94 (Ill. 1993) (holding a hospital 
liable for the negligent acts of an emergency room physician, who was not a 
hospital employee, because the public could reasonably assume that the physician 
was an agent of the hospital); Richmond Cnty. Hosp. Auth. v. Brown, 361 S.E.2d 
164, 166–67 (Ga. 1987) (“Most modern hospitals hold themselves out to the 
public as providing many health related services including services of physicians. 
A patient is likely to look to the hospital, not just to a particular doctor he comes 
into contact with through the hospital. . . . If [the plaintiff] can prove the hospital 
represented to [him] that its emergency room physicians were its employees and 
that he therefore justifiably relied on the skill of the doctors but suffered injury due 
to the legal insufficiency of their medical services, the hospital may be held liable 
therefor.” (citation omitted)). 
 102. Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 48 (Ohio 
1994); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965). 
 103. Shields, supra note 101 (citing Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 533 
S.E.2d 312, 322–23 (2000)); PEGALIS, supra note 74, § 6:21; Howard Levin, 
Hospital Vicarious Liability for Negligence by Independent Contractor 
Physicians: A New Rule for New Times, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1291, 1296 (2005). 
 104. Clark, 628 N.E.2d at 46. 
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contractor.105 In Clark, the court found that because the hospital 
represented to the public that the physicians worked for the hospital, 
the hospital was vicariously liable as an apparent agent.106  
The hospital’s own duty to supervise the quality of medical care 
administered in the facility is related to vicarious liability.107 This 
general duty further explains why courts can hold hospitals 
vicariously liable under a theory of ostensible agency.108 In Simmons 
v. Tuomey Regional Medical Center, the South Carolina Supreme 
Court found that the hospital owed an absolute, nondelegable duty 
to patients to provide competent services.109 Other courts have not 
followed this approach, however, by requiring that the hospital 
commit an overt act before the hospital may be held liable for 
medical treatment given at the facility.110  
Just as hospitals may be vicariously liable for a physician’s 
negligence, courts could likewise hold a hospital vicariously liable for 
injuries caused by its artificial intelligence systems. Whether the 
courts would view Watson as more of a physician or a Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (MRI) machine is an unanswered but 
fundamental question. True vicarious liability will only attach if 
Watson is analogized to an employee.111 Because of his capability 
and role in the medical team, the courts may consider Watson more 
analogous to a physician rather than to equipment. In that case, 
hospitals could potentially be able to obtain separate insurance 
policies to cover the risk of Watson causing injury just like they 
                                                                                                             
 105. Id. at 54. 
 106. Id. at 53–54. 
 107. Shields, supra note 101, at 249; Kuszler, supra note 64, at 322 (citing 
Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 256 (Ill. 1965) 
(holding the defendant hospital liable for failing to supervise the quality of care 
that its physicians and nurses administered)). 
 108. PEGALIS, supra note 74, § 6:22. 
 109. Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312, 322 (S.C. 2000). 
Some courts have labeled this type of liability as “corporate negligence.” See 
Fridena v. Evans, 622 P.2d 463, 467 (Ariz. 1980) (holding a hospital liable for 
corporate negligence in failing to adequately supervise a physician); Elam v. 
College Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (applying 
corporate liability to a hospital for negligent acts of physicians and surgeons who 
used hospital facilities); Corleto v. Shore Mem’l Hosp., 350 A.2d 534, 538 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (holding the hospital liable for giving an incompetent 
physician surgical privileges). 
 110. See Bynum v. Magno, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1266 (D. Haw. 2000) 
(“Plaintiffs must show that the hospital actually did something to imply authority, 
not just that it failed to inform patients of a lack of authority. Moreover, Plaintiffs 
must demonstrate that they somehow relied on the representations of authority” in 
order for the hospital to be liable). 
 111. Wein, supra note 99, at 110–11; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 13 cmt. a (2000). 
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insure their healthcare provider employees.112 Because Watson 
cannot be held financially responsible for making restitution, 
hospitals will likely carry much of this burden if vicariously liable. 
Despite this potential burden, however, separate insurance policies 
and a streamlined liability standard will likely encourage hospitals to 
purchase and use artificial intelligence systems. 
C. Products Liability and the Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
Products liability defines the obligations associated with product 
distribution.113 A manufacturer or retailer can be liable for making 
or selling an unreasonably dangerous product.114 Most states have 
special statutes addressing products liability separately from basic 
actions for negligence.115 Some states hold product manufacturers 
and distributors to a strict liability standard, while other states hold 
them to a simple negligence standard.116  
In a products liability suit, the plaintiff has the burden of proving 
that the injury resulted from a product defect that rendered the 
product unreasonably dangerous and that the defect existed at the 
time the product left the manufacturer.117 There are a number of 
policy reasons behind allocating liability to the manufacturer, 
including reducing the total cost of accidents by deterring accident-
causing activities and spreading the loss to more parties.118 Products 
liability actions achieve these goals and simultaneously uphold 
fundamental notions of fairness in adjudication.119 
Traditionally, hospitals and health care providers have been 
immune from products liability suits because the primary function 
                                                                                                             
 112. See PEGALIS, supra note 74, § 1:5. 
 113. AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 76, § 1.1; OWEN, 
MADDEN & DAVIS, supra note 76, § 1:5. 
 114. AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 76, § 1.1. 
 115. Louisiana also provides for the civilian contract remedy of redhibition:  
The action in redhibition is based upon the implied-in-law warranty 
against defects in the thing which would render it useless or inconvenient 
or, in other terminology, unfit for its intended use. A bad-faith seller, one 
who knows of the defect, or who declares it to have a quality it does not 
have, is liable for damages and reasonable attorney’s fees.  
WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, TORT LAW § 16:10, in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE 404 (2d ed. 2009). Redhibition differs from products liability in that 
redhibition covers damage to the thing itself, while products liability covers 
damage that the thing causes. Id. § 16:11, at 405–09. Plaintiffs can concurrently 
maintain products liability actions and redhibition actions. Id. § 16:11, at 407–08. 
 116. OWEN, MADDEN & DAVIS, supra note 76, § 1:5. 
 117. AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 76, § 1:4.  
 118. Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 118 (La. 1986). 
 119. Id. at 118–19. 
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of healthcare providers is to provide services, not to sell goods.120 
Although a hospital or physician may inadvertently provide goods to 
a patient when providing medical services, those goods are merely 
incidental.121 The services versus sales distinction has been 
fundamental in protecting physicians and hospitals from products 
liability suits.122 Manufacturers of medical equipment and devices, 
however, can still be liable through products liability actions.123 
Thus, “the cybersurgical robotic manufacturer must properly warn 
patients of potential danger of the instrument, properly design the 
instrument, and properly manufacture the instrument, if the 
manufacturer is to avoid liability in a lawsuit.”124  
The learned intermediary doctrine prevents plaintiffs from suing 
medical device manufacturers directly.125 Manufacturers have the 
duty to warn consumers of potential dangers inherent in a product’s 
natural use.126 In the case of medical devices, manufacturers have a 
                                                                                                             
 120. Christopher L. Thompson, Imposing Strict Products Liability on Medical 
Care Providers, 60 MO. L. REV. 711, 715–18 (1995) (citing Perlmutter v. Beth 
David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792, 795 (N.Y. 1954) (holding that blood transfusions 
were services, not sales, and that the physician–patient relationship was to provide 
services, not goods)). 
 121. Thompson, supra note 120, at 717. 
 122. Thomas R. McLean, Cybersurgery—An Argument for Enterprise 
Liability, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 167, 181 (2002) (citation omitted). See also Cafazzo 
v. Cent. Med. Health Servs., Inc., 635 A.2d 151,152–54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) 
(holding that a hospital was not strictly liable for a defective joint implant); Hoff v. 
Zimmer, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 872, 874–76 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (holding that a hospital 
was not strictly liable for a defective hip prosthetic); Carmichael v. Reitz, 95 Cal. 
Rptr. 381, 392–93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that a doctor was not strictly 
liable for prescribing defective medication); Easterly v. HSP of Tex., Inc., 772 
S.W.2d 211, 214 (Tex. App. 1989) (holding that a hospital was not liable for 
defective medical equipment used during surgery); Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Med. 
Ctr., 225 Cal. Rptr. 595, 602 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a hospital was not 
strictly liable for a defective pacemaker); N. Miami Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Goldberg, 
520 So. 2d 650, 651–52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the hospital was 
not strictly liable for a burn injury caused by a defective electro-surgical pad used 
during surgery). 
 123. McLean, supra note 122, at 183.  
 124. Id.  
 125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); Ehlis v. Shire 
Richwood, Inc., 367 F.3d 1013, 1019 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that the learned 
intermediary doctrine prevented the plaintiff from suing the drug manufacturer); 
Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829, 843 (Conn. 2001) (holding that the learned 
intermediary doctrine barred the plaintiff’s claim against the pharmaceutical 
manufacturer). 
 126. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 2004) (“In 
general, a supplier has a duty to warn end users of a dangerous product if it is 
reasonably foreseeable that an injury could occur in its use.” (citation omitted)); 
Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1994) (finding 
that manufacturers have a continuing duty to warn consumers about the dangers 
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duty to warn the treating physician of the product’s potential 
dangers.127 The physician becomes a learned intermediary between 
the manufacturer and the patient, eliminating any duty the 
manufacturer may have had directly to the patient.128 To qualify as a 
learned intermediary, the manufacturer must adequately warn the 
treating physician about the medical device’s risks.129 The physician, 
rather than the patient, is considered the end consumer of medical 
devices because the healthcare provider is in the best position to 
weigh the risks against the possible benefits of using the device.130 
The learned intermediary doctrine results in the manufacturer having 
no duty to the patient.131 
Furthermore, because Watson is a computer system, only his 
hardware components will qualify as products in a products liability 
action.132 With a device as complicated as Watson, determining 
whether an injury caused by Watson’s diagnosis or treatment resulted 
from a defect in his software or his hardware may be difficult.133 
Because software is generally not within the scope of products 
liability, such actions against Watson may be necessarily restricted to 
                                                                                                             
 
inherent in their products, even if they do not become aware of those dangers until 
after the products have been sold). 
 127. Hamilton-Piercy, supra note 64, at 212. The learned intermediary doctrine 
was originally developed to apply to pharmaceuticals and was expanded to include 
medical devices. McLean, supra note 122, at 183–84.; Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 
750 F.2d 1227, 1231 (4th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). 
 128. Banker v. Hoehn, 718 N.Y.S.2d 438, 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) 
(citations omitted); Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc., 367 F.3d 1013, 1019 (8th Cir. 
2004); Vitanza, 778 A.2d at 843. 
 129. Hamilton-Piercy, supra note 64, at 212; In re Norplant Contraceptive 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 165 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that the physician 
being properly trained about the risks of a treatment is a requirement for the 
learned intermediary doctrine). 
 130. McLean, supra note 122, at 184; C.R. Ewell, Telemedicine: Overcoming 
Obstacles on the Road to Global Health Care, 12 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J., 
no. 2, 2003, at 68, 73. 
 131. Brown v. Drake-Willock Int’l, Ltd., 530 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Mich. 1995) 
(holding that the manufacturer had no duty to warn the patient); Ferrara v. Berlex 
Labs., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that prescription drug 
manufacturers had no duty to warn a patient of possible drug interactions and side 
effects); Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032 (Kan. 1990) (holding that manufacturers 
of prescription drugs and interuterine device had no duty to directly warn patients of 
the dangerous side effects and risks of those products). 
 132. Software is not within the scope of products liability. Seldon J. Childers, 
Don’t Stop the Music: No Strict Products Liability for Embedded Software, 19 U. 
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 125, 128 (2008). 
 133. Id. at 128, 142. 
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blatant hardware failures.134 Trying to distinguish between hardware 
and software failures for such a complex system could be a 
formidable challenge for any court to assess. 
This liability structure makes it challenging for patients to win 
products liability suits in medical device cases. Because hospitals and 
physicians provide services rather than goods, products liability does 
not apply to these entities.135 However, the learned intermediary 
doctrine prevents patients from seeking recovery from manufacturers 
directly.136 All that remains to the consumer is a medical malpractice 
action against the healthcare provider.137 The multitude of conflicting 
legal doctrines will make products liability claims against Watson 
unduly complex and difficult to address. 
D. FDA and the Medical Device Regulatory Scheme 
Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) of 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in 1976.138 Under the MDA, the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) uses a system of classes to 
regulate medical devices.139 Classes range in dangerousness from 
Class I devices, the least dangerous, to Class III devices, the most 
dangerous.140 Class I devices include gloves and bedpans, which 
have a very low potential for causing harm and have the least 
stringent regulations, known as general controls.141 Class II devices 
include more sophisticated instruments with a higher possibility of 
causing harm, such as oxygen masks.142 They are subject to 
performance standards called special controls, in addition to general 
                                                                                                             
 134. Id. at 122. “Almost universally, judges have refused to apply strict 
products liability to software, usually by finding that software is not a ‘product.’” 
Id. at 128 (footnote omitted). A blatant hardware failure, for example, could 
include situations in which Watson catches fire and burns someone or in which 
Watson shuts down while monitoring and managing life support, resulting in the 
patient’s death. 
 135. Thompson, supra note 120, at 715–18. 
 136. Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc., 367 F.3d 1013, 1019 (8th Cir. 2004); 
Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829, 843 (Conn. 2001). 
 137. There are also issues with federal preemption under the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) regulations, including the Medical Device Amendments 
(MDA). See infra Part II.D. 
 138. McLean, supra note 122, at 187; Act of May 28, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
295, 90 Stat. 539; 21 U.S.C. § 351–360ddd-2 (2006, Supp. V 2011, & Westlaw 
2013). 
 139. McLean, supra note 122, at 187; 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); 
21 U.S.C. § 360c (Westlaw 2013). 
 140. McLean, supra note 122, at 187; 21 U.S.C. § 360c. 
 141. McLean, supra note 122, at 187–88; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470, 476–77 (1996); 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A). 
 142. 21 U.S.C. § 360c. 
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controls.143 Class III devices “‘presen[t] a potential unreasonable 
risk of illness or injury,’ or . . . are ‘purported or represented to be 
for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is 
of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human 
health.’”144  
The FDA subjects Class III devices to stringent testing with the 
Pre-Market Approval (PMA) process, in which the FDA reviews all 
clinical and laboratory tests about the device’s safety and 
effectiveness.145 Manufacturers are required to report accidents 
related to the device’s use.146 However, medical devices can bypass 
the PMA process if they are substantially similar to a product on the 
market before the amendments were enacted.147 Currently, 98% of 
devices released to the market bypass the approval process through 
this exception.148  
Where the MDA applies, it preempts some state law claims; 
however, whether the MDA preempts state products liability law is 
unclear.149 In Medtronic v. Lohr, the United States Supreme Court 
held that the MDA did not preempt the plaintiff’s claims because 
Florida’s products liability requirements were identical to the 
requirements under the act.150 The court further found that state 
statutes are only preempted when the FDA establishes “‘specific 
counterpart regulations or . . . other specific requirements applicable 
to a particular device.’”151  
The Court reinforced this opinion in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 
holding that the MDA does not preempt claims based on violations 
of FDA regulations.152 The Court relied on its rationale in Lohr, 
which declared that the MDA only preempts state requirements that 
differ from or add to the federal statute.153 Accordingly, the MDA 
does not preempt state statutes that are parallel to the federal 
requirements.154 Some lower courts have limited the Supreme 
                                                                                                             
 143. McLean, supra note 122, at 187–88; Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 476–77; 21 
U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B). 
 144. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 477 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); 21 
U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C). 
 145. 21 U.S.C. § 360; McLean, supra note 122, at 187–88. 
 146. McLean, supra note 122, at 188. 
 147. Id. at 190; Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 477–78. 
 148. McLean, supra note 122, at 191. 
 149. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496–97; Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 
322–23 (2008). 
 150. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496–97. 
 151. Id. at 498 (alteration in original) (quoting 21 CFR § 808.1(d) (1995)). 
 152. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 322–23. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 330. 
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Court’s holding in those cases.155 One district court refused to 
extend Lohr and Riegel to state statutes that only incidentally 
regulated medical devices, holding instead that the MDA preempts 
all state products liability claims, except those substantially identical 
or equivalent to the federal statutes.156 
Watson is not a typical medical device contemplated by the 
MDA, such as a pacemaker, heart valve, or cybersurgical 
instrument.157 Although Watson will diagnose and treat patients, he 
will not be surgically embedded into them. If Watson were 
classified under the MDA, it is unclear into which class he would fit. 
Because Watson currently only makes recommendations to the 
treating physician, he may not pose any more risk to a patient than a 
textbook or the Internet, which are clearly outside the scope of 
medical device regulation.158 However, Watson does make a clear 
impact on patients through his diagnosis and treatment 
recommendations, so he could be classified as a Class II or III 
device. FDA regulations emanating from the MDA preempt certain 
state law claims in some jurisdictions, further complicating any 
potential lawsuits involving Watson.159 
III. PROPOSAL: A STREAMLINED SYSTEM FOR ADDRESSING LIABILITY 
ISSUES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ROBOTIC SYSTEMS IN 
MEDICINE 
Our current legal regimes seem inadequate when applied to 
artificial intelligence. Medical malpractice does not perfectly apply to 
Watson because injecting an artificial intelligence system into the 
physician–patient relationship creates new questions of whether 
Watson can form a physician–patient relationship leading to an 
independent duty to the patient, whether the guidelines for informed 
consent and the standard of care will change to accommodate 
Watson, and how to properly assess causation and fault against 
Watson and his team of healthcare provider assistants.160 It is likewise 
unclear how vicarious liability may apply to the physicians who work 
                                                                                                             
 155. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr has been questioned by the Indiana Supreme 
Court, Dow Chem. Co. v. Ebling ex rel. Ebling, 753 N.E.2d 633 (Ind. 2001), and a 
Minnesota district court, In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Minn. 2009).  
 156. Gelber v. Stryker Corp., 752 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 157. McLean, supra note 122, at 187. 
 158. As Watson gains further capabilities, such as being directly linked into 
medical monitoring and life support equipment, it would likely become more 
sensible to classify him under the MDA. 21 U.S.C. § 360 (Westlaw 2013). 
 159. See McLean, supra note 122, at 188 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 360k (1994)). 
 160. See supra Part II.A. 
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with Watson and Watson’s owners.161 The dueling legal theories in 
products liability also do not provide a clear solution; patients have 
little recourse in actions surrounding medical devices.162 Federal law 
further complicates product liability actions involving medical 
devices by preempting many state law claims under the MDA.163  
The law currently is a conglomeration of legal regimes that do not 
clearly apply to artificial intelligence systems. As a result, different 
courts could apply different theories to similar cases, leading to 
inconsistent results.164 A streamlined method for assessing liability 
against artificial intelligence systems will likely encourage this 
technology’s use. For instance, removing doubts about who will be 
liable and to what extent the responsible party will be financially 
responsible if these systems malfunction will likely encourage 
hospitals to adopt this emerging technology.165 Additionally, cases 
involving Watson will necessarily involve a team of supporting 
physicians. Distinguishing fault and causation between the actors for 
a traditional comparative fault analysis can be a very complex 
inquiry.166 A regime based on enterprise liability combining elements 
of medical malpractice, products liability, and vicarious liability will 
adequately address the legal challenges raised by Watson while 
ensuring fairness and consistency between courts. 
One scholar suggests using an enterprise liability approach, 
which makes the business organization providing medical services 
                                                                                                             
 161. See supra Part II.B. 
 162. See supra Part II.C. 
 163. See supra Part II.D. 
 164. For an expression by the United States Supreme Court on the importance 
of consistency in the law, see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827–28 (1991) 
(“Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, 
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on 
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the 
judicial process. . . . Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in 
cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are 
involved.” (citations omitted)). 
 165. Aside from hospitals, nursing homes and home health agencies could also 
make use of this technology. See Richard J. Agnich & Steven F. Goldstone, What 
Business Will Look for in Corporate Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 6, 13 (2000) (discussing the importance of consistency and predictability 
in the law to support and promote business growth); Timothy Hay, Medical-
Device Venture Capitalists Go to Washington, WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2011, 2:48  
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2011/06/08/medical-device-venture- 
capitalists-go-to-washington/?KEYWORDS=consistency+and+predictability+of 
+law (discussing how medical device venture capitalists want more “consistency, 
predictability and transparency” from federal law). 
 166. See Martin J. McMahon, Joint and Several Liability of Physicians Whose 
Independent Negligence in Treatment of Patient Causes Indivisible Injury, 9 
A.L.R.5th 746 § 2[a], at 758–59 (2011). 
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the “exclusive bearer of liability for all medical negligence.”167 
According to the traditional enterprise liability approach, fault and 
causation are analyzed against the team of actors, “the enterprise,” 
rather against the individuals that compose the team.168 No further 
analysis occurs on the relative fault of each individual actor.169 Once 
the enterprise’s fault is established, a single actor, generally the head 
of the enterprise, must make financial restitution.170 Although this 
approach would simplify the process and make plaintiffs getting 
adequate restitution easier, this approach places a disproportionate 
burden on the business organization and creates an economic 
disincentive for Watson’s use.171 Assessing all malpractice liability 
against Watson’s owners, whether a hospital, nursing home, or 
clinic, could bankrupt healthcare institutions and prevent Watson 
and other artificial intelligence technology from being used at all.172 
This Comment proposes a system based on enterprise liability, but 
this proposal differs from other models because restitution will be 
equally shared among actors to better spread the risk of loss and 
reduce the economic disincentives associated with the traditional 
enterprise liability system. Because no current theory of liability 
clearly applies to lawsuits involving Watson, a new liability scheme 
based on enterprise liability is necessary to encourage artificial 
intelligence systems’ use in medicine. 
                                                                                                             
 167. McLean, supra note 122, at 205. 
 168. See Kristie Tappan, Note, Medical-Malpractice Reform: Is Enterprise 
Liability or No-Fault a Better Reform?, 46 B.C. L. REV. 1095, 1104 (2005). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See David H. Rutchik, Note, The Emerging Trend of Corporate Liability: 
Courts’ Uneven Treatment of Hospital Standards Leaves Hospitals Uncertain and 
Exposed, 47 VAND. L. REV. 535, 571 (1994) (discussing the problems that arise by 
assessing increased corporate liability against hospitals). See also generally James 
Boyd & Daniel E. Ingberman, The Search for Deep Pockets: Is “Extended 
Liability” Expensive Liability?, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 232 (discussing the adverse 
economic effects of increasing tort liability). See also ROGER A. ARNOLD, 
MICROECONOMICS 217 (7th ed. 2005) (explaining how an increase in the cost of 
production creates disincentives); ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, 
MICROECONOMICS 239 (7th ed. 2009) (analyzing the steel industry as an example 
of how production costs affect business). 
 172. Rutchik, supra note 171; Boyd & Ingberman, supra note 171; ARNOLD, 
supra note 171; PINDYCK & RUBINFIELD, supra note 171. Half of the nation’s 
hospitals are already troubled financially. Lisa Girion, Half of Hospitals in the 
Red, Study Finds, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com 
/2009/mar/02/business/fi-hospitals2. Assessing greater liability against hospitals 
would put an even greater financial strain on hospitals already forced to cut 
services and lay-off staff. Id. 
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A. Paving the Way for the First Generation Watson System 
The legislature should create a special cause of action for suing 
artificial intelligence systems. The first tier of this system should 
distinguish the cause of action. The statute should direct the court to 
determine initially the direct cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Based on 
this determination, the case will either proceed under products 
liability or medical malpractice.173 Forcing the case to proceed under 
a single theory will require the court to make an initial assessment of 
the direct cause of the plaintiff’s injury, and it will reduce the total 
number of lawsuits involving Watson.174  
An action against an artificial intelligence system like Watson 
should entail one action with alternate theories of recovery. This 
statutory scheme for assessing liability should first address whether 
the case arises out of a defect in the system’s hardware.175 A panel 
of experts should examine the system to determine whether the 
injury’s source was a hardware failure. If the hardware failure is the 
injury’s cause-in-fact, the case should proceed against the 
manufacturer.176 If maintenance issues are implicated, the case may 
also proceed against Watson’s owner under a theory of contributory 
negligence or comparative fault.177 To spread the risk of loss, states 
should require manufacturers of artificial intelligence systems that 
                                                                                                             
 173. J.A. Jones Const. Co. v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc., 89 P.3d 1009, 
1017 (Nev. 2004) (“A party may not assert contradictory theories of recovery such 
that the assertion of one theory will necessarily repudiate the other.”). But see 
Arter v. Spathas, 779 P.2d 1066, 1068–69 (Or. 1989) (“The doctrine of election 
between inconsistent remedies does not require an election until the matter has 
gone to judgment. . . . A party need only choose between or among inconsistent 
remedies, not inconsistent claims or theories of recovery.” (citations omitted)). 
Under this regime, plaintiffs would be free to plead both products liability and 
medical malpractice theories; however, for the sake of judicial efficiency, the court 
would make an initial inquiry into causation and proceed under the most 
appropriate theory. 
 174. See Richard O. Zerbe Jr., An Integration of Equity and Efficiency, 73 
WASH. L. REV. 349, 361 (1998) (discussing the role of cost-benefit analysis in 
analyzing judicial efficiency). See also generally Warren F. Schwartz & Gordon 
Tullock, Costs of a Legal System, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 75 (1975) (analyzing judicial 
efficiency from the standpoint of efficient distribution of rights and costs of 
enforcement); Gordon Tullock, Two Kinds of Legal Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
659 (1980) (discussing the effect of bias towards “deep pockets” on judicial 
efficiency). 
 175. Software is generally not within the scope of products liability because 
courts consistently hold that software is not a product. Childers, supra note 132, at 
128 (2008).  
 176. AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 76, § 1:5; OWEN, 
MADDEN & DAVIS, supra note 76, § 1:5. 
 177. AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 76, § 39:2. 
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will be used to treat patients to develop a fund to pay claims 
resulting from products liability issues. 
If no hardware is defective, the claim should instead proceed 
under the state’s medical malpractice regime against the hospital 
enterprise. In most projected situations, the enterprise would include 
Watson, his owner, and all the physicians that were part of the 
treatment plan that led to injury.178 To counteract any disincentives 
associated with Watson’s use, Watson should be protected like 
physicians under state medical malpractice regimes, including limits 
on liability, or “caps.”179 In many states, this would mean that any 
cap on medical malpractice should also limit Watson’s liability.180 
Placing a disproportionate procedural burden on Watson results in 
new disincentives against his use.181 Equalizing the actors and 
providing Watson the same procedural protections given to other 
healthcare providers helps to counteract any disincentives that 
businesses may face while still providing avenues of recovery for 
plaintiffs. 
Because Watson cannot own property and does not earn wages, 
the question of liability must be separated from the question of 
restitution.182 In a negligence analysis, courts first look to causation 
before assessing damages.183 The same approach should be used in 
lawsuits against Watson; however, fault and causation should be 
assessed against the enterprise rather than against the individual 
defendants.184 Separating fault between the physicians, Watson, and 
the hospital will be an incredibly fact-based, complex inquiry that 
may be unrealistic.185 Enterprise liability allows the courts to 
                                                                                                             
 178. McLean, supra note 46, at 496 (discussing traditional enterprise liability 
in which a hospital would be held liable for the negligence of all of the actors 
involved in medical care occurring under its auspices). As McLean points out, 
however, this creates disincentives, which is why this Comment suggests a 
modified form of enterprise liability. 
 179. See supra note 171 (discussing the economic forces on hospitals and 
general economic theory on disincentives). 
 180. For instance, the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act places a $100,000 
limit on each doctor’s liability. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42 (Supp. 2013). 
The plaintiff’s total recovery is capped at $500,000, with a special fund, the 
Patient’s Compensation Fund, paying the difference. Id.; id. § 40:1299.44. 
 181. See supra note 171 (discussing the economic forces on hospitals and 
general economic theory on disincentives). 
 182. Although this is a theoretical distinction in some sense, separating the 
cause of harm from the source of money that will pay for the harm clarifies the 
parties’ role in a suit against Watson. Because these suits will involve several third 
party defendants, including insurance companies, clarifying liability helps to 
simplify the proceedings. 
 183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 328A, 328B, 328C, 328D (1965). 
 184. Tappan, supra note 168, at 1104. 
 185. Id. 
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analyze the team’s fault without breaking into the interrelated 
actions of the individual actors.186 
Even when courts determine that a physician committed 
malpractice, the doctor is generally not the party actually paying 
damages to the plaintiff.187 Insurance acts to better spread the risk of 
loss throughout society, reducing the economic impact of each 
individual judgment.188 Every practicing physician carries 
malpractice insurance to guard against the threat of lawsuits.189 
Hospitals should be able to insure Watson against medical 
malpractice as physicians insure themselves. Hospitals should also be 
able to obtain enterprise liability insurance to protect them from being 
liable with the enterprise.190 Once fault is assessed against the 
enterprise, each actor, including Watson and the hospital, will be 
responsible for an equal share of restitution. In effect, each actor’s 
malpractice insurance will pay for part of the claim. Involving 
multiple policies and insurers helps reduce the economic impact of 
each individual lawsuit by further spreading the risk of loss. 
By first separating the relevant causes of action, courts can 
reduce the total number of lawsuits involving Watson while 
focusing on the direct cause of the plaintiff’s injury.191 This also 
helps provide some insulation against liability for Watson’s owners 
by properly assessing responsibility against the manufacturer for 
hardware defects.192 Applying enterprise liability to the question of 
fault simplifies an impossibly complex analysis and provides 
plaintiffs a more direct route to recovery. Spreading liability for 
restitution equally among all actors in the enterprise could better 
reduce the economic impact of each lawsuit by further spreading the 
risk of loss among a greater number of parties. By reducing the 
economic impact of each lawsuit, this quasi-enterprise system 
reduces any disincentives the medical community may have against 
purchasing and using Watson and other artificial intelligence 
systems. 
                                                                                                             
 186. Id. 
 187. PEGALIS, supra note 74, § 1.5. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. McLean, supra note 122, at 205. 
 191. See supra note 173 (discussing the pleading of multiple causes of action); 
supra note 174 (discussing judicial efficiency). 
 192. See supra Part II.C. 
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B. Addressing Artificial Intelligence Systems of the Future 
First-generation Watson systems will be limited to interacting 
with physicians and helping them with diagnosis and treatment.193 If 
IBM integrates Watson into electronic medical equipment, then 
Watson could one day directly treat patients. Watson would be 
similar to a very complex pacemaker, monitoring the patient and 
administering treatment as necessary. Once artificial intelligence 
systems make this leap into medicine, states will be required to 
revisit their legal regimes to reassess liability constructs. 
The law should treat true artificial intelligence systems as quasi-
juridical persons.194 Artificial intelligence systems with the capacity 
to learn and change over time are inherently independent.195 Further, 
artificial intelligence systems make autonomous decisions and can 
take action at their own initiative.196 Although Watson will likely 
always have an owner, the law should recognize that the owner 
could never assert full control over the system and that the system 
changes from the time it is first created and purchased.197 Once 
Watson evolves into a sentient system with true artificial 
intelligence, the law should recognize Watson as an autonomous 
decision maker. 
Labeling artificial intelligence systems as quasi-juridical persons 
would endow Watson with some rights and duties, specifically the 
capacity to be sued as an independent entity.198 Because Watson is 
not capable of filing or answering lawsuits, the hospital or business 
that owns Watson will have to act on his behalf, as the board of 
directors does for a corporation.199 Allowing Watson to be sued 
directly clarifies legal proceedings by allowing plaintiffs to focus the 
lawsuit more narrowly to the potentially responsible parties.200  
                                                                                                             
 193. See supra Part I.A. 
 194. Wein, supra note 99, at 107. 
 195. Hans Moravec, Rise of the Robots: The Future of Artificial Intelligence, 
SCIENTIFIC AM. (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm 
?id=rise-of-the-robots; Kuriko Miyake, Showing Off the Future of Artificial 
Intelligence, PCWORLD (Mar. 29, 2002, 6:00 AM), http://www.pcworld 
.com/article/91863/article.html; Predicting AI’s Future, BBC NEWS (Sept. 21, 
2001, 2:03 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/i§n_depth/sci_tech/2001/artificial 
_intelligence/1555742.stm. 
 196. Moravec, supra note 195; Miyake, supra note 195. 
 197. Moravec, supra note 195; Miyake, supra note 195. 
 198. For example, these rights and duties would include freedom of 
expression, the right to due process, and protection from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. Wein, supra note 99, at 107–09. 
 199. JAMES D. COX AND THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS §§ 1:2, 7:3 (3d ed. 2011). 
 200. Wein, supra note 99, at 114. 
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The law will have to decide whether Watson can breach 
duties.201 Because current medical malpractice schemes present 
issues when applied to artificial intelligence systems like Watson, 
the law should proactively accept that Watson does have a duty to 
patients that could be breached.202 Before claims could be brought 
against Watson in court, a medical review panel should review 
Watson’s reports and evidence to determine if this was a reasonable 
course of treatment from the perspective of a human physician. 
Holding Watson to the same standard as other doctors will better 
protect patients who are injured, rather than categorically reasoning 
that computers cannot make mistakes or commit negligent acts. 
Because he is a quasi-juridical person, courts should treat 
Watson the same as any other physician.203 Any recovery would be 
subject to the same state limitations that apply to other physicians 
and would be paid from the mandatory malpractice insurance policy 
that is paid by Watson’s owner.204 As the law begins to shape 
around rudimentary artificial intelligence systems like the first-
generation Watson, new laws and precedent will be created to lay 
the groundwork for more advanced future systems. Whether 
artificial intelligence systems will ever achieve more legal autonomy 
will greatly depend on what legislatures and courts do with the 
present systems. 
CONCLUSION 
The law can either support and promote technological 
innovation or impede it. Current liability regimes are not easily 
applicable to artificial intelligence systems. To encourage the use of 
artificial intelligence in healthcare, a new legal action based on 
enterprise liability should be created to encompass the relevant 
aspects of medical malpractice, products liability, and vicarious 
liability. Artificial intelligence will be challenging for courts to 
analyze on first impression, and putting a legal construct in place 
before artificial intelligence becomes pervasive in healthcare will 
likely incentivize the growth of this powerful technology. 
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